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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
FOUR EXAMPLES OF A TROMPE-L’OEIL IN ECONOMICS
Summary
This essay explores the occurrence of illusionary images or trompe-l’oeil in economics and their
role in economic policy design. In this context four speciﬁc examples are discussed, relating to
money illusion, the bias in the consumer price index to measure purchasing power, the economet-
rics of hyperinﬂation and the measurement of scholarly productivity.
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Almost 70 years ago, the American sociologist of science Robert K. Merton
asserted that ‘Theories which attempt to account for certain phenomena
require facts, but not all facts are equally pertinent to the problem in
hand. “Selection’,’ determined by the limits of the problem, is necessary’
(Merton (1938) but reprinted in (1973, p. 228)). In this selection Merton sup-
posedly presumed that cultural variables matter as do values and sentiments
in research programmes. In the following my working hypothesis is that in
social sciences and particularly in economics the researcher’s convictions and
beliefs play a major role, at least implicitly and often subconsciously. Per-
haps some of these convictions and beliefs are inﬂuential and, according to
Merton, worthy of further investigation. I have therefore opted for a critical
assessment of four topics of research which, in my view, have in common the
tenets of a misleading illusion or trompe-l’oeil. The topics considered, which
are of either a positive or a normative nature, are discussed in the follow-
ing four sections of this essay. They concern money illusion, consumer price
measurement, the research on hyperinﬂation and the fashionable practice of
citation analysis, i.e. counting the number of citations to assess scholarly pro-
ductivity. The ﬁnal section concludes.
1 MONEY ILLUSION: NEGLECTED IN RESEARCH AND POLICY
The term money illusion was coined three quarters of a century ago by Irving
Fisher, who deﬁned it as ‘the failure to perceive that the dollar, or any other
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unit of money, expands or shrinks in value’ (Fisher(1928, p. 4)). As a matter
of fact, money illusion refers to individual or aggregate economic behaviour
that consists in failing to distinguish transactions in terms of nominal or real
monetary values. This odd tendency is a corollary of the fact that money as
a measure of value or unit of account, such as the dollar or the euro, differs
fundamentally from physical yardsticks, like miles, kilos, or ohms, in that it is
not an intrinsically ﬁxed and invariable measure over time.
This failure of the public to recognize real and nominal monetary changes
as distinguishable facts is primarily a psychological phenomenon. However,
this psychological idiosyncrasy does not imply that it fails to have any eco-
nomic effects in the real world, as will be indicated below. In neoclassical eco-
nomic theory, with its remarkable bias towards monetary neutrality with its
strong belief in a money veil, these monetary effects often have been assumed
away. So money illusion has been regarded with some suspicion, because the
basic assumption of its absence underlies the long-run neutrality property
embraced by the quantity theory of money.
Authors such as Leontief (1936), and Haberler (1941) in a footnote on
p. 4601, consider money illusion a violation of the homogeneity postulate of
economic theory. This theory hypothesizes that for goods and services the
demand and supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal
prices; i.e. that demand and supply depend on relative rather than absolute
prices and thus are insensitive to absolute price changes. Patinkin (1949, 1965)
extended this to include monetary assets as cash balances. Consequently, Pat-
inkin postulates the absence of money illusion on the basis of the zero-
homogeneity property of net-demand functions in all money prices and the
money value of initial holdings of assets. Operationally this is equivalent to
the assumption of rational economic behaviour predicting that a proportional
change in all prices and monetary balances would leave money’s purchasing
power unaffected. It is this very property that offers an operational yardstick
for the observation and perhaps measurement of money illusion in practice.
The absence of money illusion is the main assumption underlying neoclas-
sical economic theory, which cherishes David Hume’s famous but question-
able money veil which, according to Pigou (1941, pp. 20–27), denotes that
money, in itself not comprising any of the essentials of real economic life, is
only useful as a means of exchange for other things that are of direct signiﬁ-
cance for economic welfare. Nevertheless, recognition of money illusion has
a long tradition among heterodox and especially monetary economists. With
his 1928 monograph Money Illusion, Irving Fisher devoted an entire book to
this topic, attempting to illustrate the occurrence of money illusion in the real
world on the basis of anecdotic, historical and statistical evidence. To him,
money illusion was an important explanation for business cycle ﬂuctuations.
1 Surprisingly the relevant footnote has disappeared in the later than 1941-editions of
Haberler’s monograph.
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Nowadays, interest in the empirical validity of the assumption of money illu-
sion is no longer anathema to the economics profession, ﬁrstly, because the
presence of money illusion helps to account for price stickiness and less than
perfect economic adjustment processes and, secondly, because a lot of empir-
ical or quasi-empirical evidence seems to support the occurrence of money
illusion in real life.
Two kinds of evidence seem to dominate. On the one hand, several well-
designed psychological experiments at the individual level show a convinc-
ing bias towards nominal rather than real magnitudes, which according to
these ﬁndings results in considerable inertia (see Shaﬁr et al. (1997); Fehr and
Tyran (1997)). On the other hand, recent experience also appears to provide
clear-cut evidence for the existence of money illusion at the individual and
aggregate levels. The most notable historical evidence is associated with the
introduction of the euro in 2002. This gigantic currency operation offered
a splendid opportunity for a real-life experiment to examine the occurrence
of money illusion in the main western European countries then joining the
European Monetary Union with its common monetary policy. From a purely
monetary point of view, the replacement of the national currencies of the
eurozone countries by a single currency merely amounted to a redeﬁnition of
prices through multiplication by a given and ﬁxed number, e.g. 0.45 for the
Dutch guilder. According to the homogeneity postulate -that is the absence
of money illusion- demand and supply conditions remain unchanged. How-
ever, as a matter of fact this purely nominal operation actually resulted in
an upward though hardly statistically registered pressure of prices for par-
ticular commodities and especially services, affecting household expenditure
considerably, as national account statistics of eurozone countries unambigu-
ously show. This statistical observation, combined with ad hoc information
on expenditure in several sectors of the economy in the relevant countries,
points to some degree of money illusion with the consumers. So, both eco-
nomic experiments (in this case with questionnaires on hypothetical situa-
tions allowing either nominal or volume variations) and designed experiments
with actually observed expenditure behaviour apparently violate the neutrality
property of money. Hence, the experimental evidence indicates the existence
of money illusion in day-to-day life. Moreover, the difﬁculty of distinguishing
between real and nominal exchange rates in daily economic activity pro-
vides additional empirical support for this conclusion. Finally, recent sta-
tistics on remarkably increasing bank indebtedness of households in the
Netherlands, which over the years since 2002 surprisingly coincides with the
introduction of the euro, also provide fresh circumstantial evidence for the
occurrence of money illusion among the public in recent time spans as indi-
cated in Fase (2005). This however, does not mean that it offers a solid time
series historical account of this interesting economic phenomenon, enabling
economic historians to examine it further. Taken together, the occurrence of
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money illusion is quite likely in the real world and is, in fact, nothing but a
particular manifestation of either incomplete knowledge or market frictions in
society that hamper the perfect market clearing. Both discredit the monetary
neutrality assumption of neoclassical economic theory and the harmlessness
of a nominal monetary reform for purchasing power such as the introduction
of the euro in 2002. Perhaps the assumption of neutrality around 2002 was
the trompe-l’oeil of monetary policy makers.
2 MEASUREMENT ILLUSION: BIASES IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
In almost every country the consumer price index plays a particular socio-
economic role through the institutional arrangements of society. Firstly, it is
an overall measure of consumer commodity inﬂation. In that role it is used
to index social security beneﬁts, other public security support and income
tax brackets against inﬂation in order to compensate for the effect of price
changes on purchasing power. Moreover and secondly, it serves as the or one
of the indicators of monetary policy. Of the latter the ECB’s monetary pol-
icy in the EMU is a splendid illustration. These two particular uses require
an undisputable and transparent production process at the statistics agen-
cies. However, this is beyond any doubt. Of course, this statistical competence
also depends on the technical capabilities available to and the budgetary con-
straints imposed on the national statistical agencies. Furthermore, this pre-
sumes absolute integrity of the technical process of making the most accurate
possible price index numbers to serve society. In western societies there is no
reason to doubt this.
Assessment of the purchasing power of money is a classical topic in mon-
etary economics, providing the yardstick for quantifying domestic inﬂation.
While measuring prices and their rate of change, i.e. the inﬂation rate, is of
great and vital importance for every economy, its accuracy is of a fundamen-
tally different nature than the occurrence of money illusion. This is so in spite
of the fact that both focus on prices. National statistical agencies of all over
the world produce consumer price indices to establish a cost of living index
to assess the purchasing power of money, which for obvious reasons has a
high policy sensitivity in modern society. Among economists and index num-
ber statisticians there is agreement that the consumer price index is at best a
close approximation of the cost of living. The accuracy of this approximation
or the appropriateness of the consumer price index is the issue to be consid-
ered here.
According to economic theory the consumer price index, which tracks the
cost of purchasing a ﬁxed market based basket of goods and services, repre-
sents the upper bound on the change in the true cost of living, assuming sta-
ble consumer preferences. This is an ideal and for that reason in some way
a misleading economic illusion or trompe-l’oeil, notably because under par-
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ticular circumstances this speciﬁc presumption has important policy implica-
tions. In the case of many households, following Diewert (1998), the social
cost of living index, which is more relevant than the index of the virtual rep-
resentative economic agent in consumer theory, is the ratio of the total min-
imum expenditure required to enable each of the households present in two
periods of time to attain their reference utility levels in both time periods.
A Laspeyres index, which deﬁnes the cost of purchasing a ﬁxed basket of
goods and services in the base period and the cost of buying the same bas-
ket in the present, tends, according to standard theory as the upper bound of
the cost of living index, to overstate the rise of the cost of living. It does so
because it allows no substitution between goods and services. However, fol-
lowing Deaton and Muellbauer(1980, p. 170) and others, a single commod-
ity bundle is an unnecessary restrictive interpretation of what is to represent
a constant standard of living. An obvious alternative and certainly a more
abstract theoretical avenue is to take a speciﬁc utility level or indifference
curve as the reference to be held constant. According to this interpretation
the cost of living index is the ratio of the minimum expenditures required
to attain the reference indifference curve of two sets of prices. This reason-
ing, quite naturally, results in two possible index number devices. The ﬁrst is
the base quantity weighted, or Laspeyres price, index, representing the upper
bound of the cost of living index. The other is the current quantity weighted
index, known as the Paasche price index, representing the lower bound of
the cost of living index. The Paasche index has the advantage of taking into
account the occurrence of commodity substitution and the appearance of
new consumer goods. Unfortunately, the practicality of this theoretical con-
clusion is limited because the required data on expenditure outlays obtained
from consumer surveys unavoidably lag behind considerably. This all is well
known among economists and consumer price statisticians, but becomes of
vital importance in times of enhanced market dynamics such as shown in the
last decades or so. In 1994 it was precisely because of these enhanced mar-
ket dynamics of the economy that the then Fed chairman Alan Greenspan
told US Congress at a hearing that the US inﬂation rate measured by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index, was likely to be annually
at least one percentage point too high and thus over-rated the actual annual
price increases. Greenspan’s one percent upward bias in the measured con-
sumer price index vis-a`-vis the true cost of living was certainly an expert’s
guess he made in view of his policy perception and desire of monetary neu-
trality which, according to the Fed chairman, is the level of inﬂation that
does not materially enter into the decisions of households and ﬁrms.2 Two
2 This is an old idea going back to the Austrian School and notably Carl Menger. He pro-
posed the so called inner value of money as the appropriate inﬂation measure, a concept
closely related to today’s core or headline inﬂation. See Fase and Folkertsma (2001) on this
issue.
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years later, in 1996, Greenspan’s conjecture was substantiated empirically by
a group of experts under the leadership of Michael J. Boskin, a former chair-
man of the Economic Counsel of the president of the US. This so-termed
Boskin Commission, which for its ﬁndings relied solely on existing research
drawn from the literature without performing original studies on index num-
bers by itself, concluded that the consumer price index as a measure of the
cost of living overstated the increase in the true cost of living by 1.1% points
a year. Moreover, it established a plausible range for this upward bias of 0.80–
1.60% points per year with the reported 1.1 percentage points as the best esti-
mate of its mean.3 The policy implications of this quantitative ﬁnding for
indexed government beneﬁts and tax brackets as well as for the relative size
of US government debt were enormous and provoked a lot of public and
academic debate. One of the outcomes of this debate was a renewed inter-
est among economists and ofﬁcial statistical agencies in making price index
numbers. But this was not the only remarkable result. The impact of the
Boskin report was profound and inversely proportional to the out-of-pocket
cost of the commission’s work, which amounted only to a slight 25,000 US
dollars. Anyhow the Boskin report resulted in an aggiornamento of the the-
ory on price index numbers, important initiatives on data collection, and an
incentive for hopeful innovative research at the ofﬁcial statistical agencies in
North America and Western Europe.
As to the sources of the established upward bias of the ofﬁcial consumer
price index in the US – and presumably also in other western countries
– three important elementary economic facts came to the fore. These are
the goods and services substitution bias explaining 0.4% points of the dis-
crepancy, the outlet substitution bias that accounts for 0.10% points of the
upward bias and the quality plus new products bias accounting for 0.60%
points of the estimated total bias of approximately 1.10% points. Presumably,
this statistical inaccuracy is an annually recurring phenomenon and for that
reason cumulative over time.
The substitution bias arises because the usual weighting with a ﬁxed
basket of goods and services does not take into account that consumers
shift away from goods and services if their relative prices or household
income change. Several commentators (Baker (1998); Diewert (1998); Abra-
ham (2003); Schultze (2003)) consider the estimated substitution bias by the
Boskin Commission in some detail by making a distinction between commod-
ity and outlet substitution, i.e. shifting to other points of sale. Diewert e.g.
accepts the Boskin estimate of commodity substitution bias but ﬁnds a much
higher estimate for outlet substitution. Diewert’s back-of-the envelope esti-
mate is 0.4, that is 0.3 percentage points above Boskin’s, noting that it may
3 The ﬁnal report is included in Getting Prices Right; the debate over the consumer price
index, edited by D. Baker, Washington/London, 1998, pp. 1–77.
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even rise with the advent of discount selling of goods and services over the
Internet.
The problem of quality change and the arrival of new products arise
because in conventional price index number construction these are considered
only implicitly by replacing items. The Boskin Commission obtained estimates
for quality change by examining 27 separate ﬁnal categories of goods and ser-
vices, resulting in an estimate of 0.6 percentage points a year. Not surpris-
ingly, the accuracy of this upward bias estimate was the most controversial
issue in the debate, mainly because this assessment required quality imputa-
tion of thousands of goods and services including new products. For this, the
economic statisticians used several methods such as hedonic regression and
formal subjective assessment. Baker (1996) criticized this Boskin estimate on
the ground that it neglected a great deal of the items in the consumer price
index. He came up with another and substantially lower estimate of −0.4%
points, comprising an opposite and downward bias of 1% point for qual-
ity changes only. Deaton (1998), another commentator, was concerned with
the rather arbitrary nature of Boskin’s estimate for quality change and new
products but nevertheless refrained from providing an alternative guess. Haus-
man (2003) also was skeptical on this score but recognizes that quality change
and the arrival of new goods may amply affect the cost of living. He there-
fore concluded that the published consumer price index may overestimate
inﬂation considerably. Together with Nordhaus (1998), Hausman believes the
Boskin Commission estimate for quality change is persuasive but not yet
conclusive. The latter is so because of omissions in areas, new products, asset
prices and the impact of major tectonic -that is revolutionary new technol-
ogy- shifts. These revolutions render the upward bias of the consumer price
index vis-a`-vis the true cost of living highly uncertain. Perhaps the inclusion
of asset prices does not pose a special problem when treated analogously to
durables such as occupational housing, taking their prices to be the rental
prices. The Boskin Commission did not report on asset prices as an exam-
ple of excluded goods in spite of the existence of thoughtful writings on
this matter (see Bryan et al. (2001) for a review). This inference is provoc-
ative and suggests another trompe-l’oeil, now in the area of price indexes.
However, what is certain is the fact that the overall upward bias is signiﬁcant
and at least 1.5% points a year. As Abraham et al. (1998) of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics have pointed out it, is an illusion to produce a perfect cost-
of-living measure although we can make important improvements when more
resources for internal research are made available. A similar conclusion pre-
sumably holds for EMU and the ECB that by setting a medium term inﬂa-
tion target of 2% anticipated an upward bias in measured price changes.4
4 See also Fase (1999) for a discussion of this.
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3 TOPIC ILLUSION: HYPERINFLATION ECONOMETRICS
Almost by deﬁnition empirical measurement of hyperinﬂation offers no prob-
lem at all. Neither does the mathematical analysis of its dynamics, although
in practice hyperinﬂation is a great political problem, as European history
shows. Hyperinﬂation typically occurs in a politically unstable environment
with astronomical increases in prices and the nominal quantity of money that
dwarf changes in real income, production, trade and similar real economic
ﬂows but drives up nominal assets and phenomena of the same kind. Fol-
lowing the seminal work of Cagan (1956), hyperinﬂation is conventionally
deﬁned by a monthly rise in prices of at least 50% over a prolonged period
of time. The classical historical examples are the seven famous hyperinﬂations
of the 1920s and mid-1940s, which Cagan examined over 50 years ago. These
were the hyperinﬂation episodes in Austria (October 1921–August 1922),
Germany (August 1922–October 1923), Greece (November 1943–November
1944), Hungary (March 1923–February 1924; August 1945–July 1946), Poland
(January 1923–January 1924) and Russia (December 1921–January 1924). Of
course, there exist other examples such as Belgium in the late 1920s, the Latin
American countries in the 1970s and thereafter, Yugoslavia in the 1990s and
Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s with in the second quarter of 2006 inﬂation hov-
ering around 1000% a year, then the highest rate in the world. However,
Cagan focused on the above six European countries presumably to illustrate
Friedman’s adage that inﬂation is a monetary phenomenon only.
Cagan studied the interwar historical episodes of hyperinﬂation as part of
Milton Friedman’s project to restore the quantity theory of money – in disre-
pute since the 1930s and 1940s – to professional respectability. The interesting
point is that Cagan’s courageous monetarist attempt provided interesting and,
among economists of the time, unknown empirical information within a solid
economic analytical framework accompanied with statistical veriﬁcation. This
was certainly novel and highly inspired by Friedman’s restated quantity theory
of money that goes back to Irving Fisher at Yale and the Chicago economists
of the 1930s. However, later generations of economists ran off with Cagan’s
mathematical approach and perhaps lost sight of the genuine core of his work
by solely focusing on econometric subtleties. These gave rise to another eco-
nomic trompe-l’oeil. It seems warranted to consider this a particular and pre-
sumably innocuous example of illusion in economics which is entirely of an
analytical nature. Perhaps, this is an exaggeration that has been encouraged
by Baumol’s (1959, p. 8) splendid monograph on the magniﬁcent dynamics.
The starting point of Cagan’s analysis of hyperinﬂation is a restatement of
Irving Fisher’s classical quantity theory of money. Working under the guid-
ance of Milton Friedman, Cagan considered the quantity theory of money
as a special case of the demand for money he postulated. His demand for
money under hyperinﬂation assumes that the real money balances decline
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with the rise of expected inﬂation in the next period, deliberately ignoring
other inﬂuences like real income and the real rate of interest. He justiﬁes
this by hypothesizing that in a situation of hyperinﬂation these inﬂuences
are negligible and could be ignored as a ﬁrst approximation because inﬂa-
tion dwarfs these real changes. However, expected inﬂation is unobservable,
which requires an additional assumption to model the expectation forma-
tion process. The expectation formation process Cagan assumed – a nov-
elty at the time – was the adaptive expectation hypothesis. The idea behind
this assumption is that the expected inﬂation rate is proportional to the dis-
crepancy between the most recent inﬂation rate and its own expected previ-
ous value, with the factor of proportionality reﬂecting the speed of adjust-
ment of expectations. This adaptive expectations hypothesis means that the
expected rate of inﬂation is adjusted upward, relative to its previous value,
when the most recent actual and observed inﬂation rate exceeds its own previ-
ously expected value. Correspondingly, when the most recent actual inﬂation
rate is smaller than its own previously expected value, expected inﬂation will
be lowered relative to its previous value. Rewriting the corresponding alge-
braic formulae of adaptive expectations, the unobservable expected inﬂation
rate can be expressed as a weighted average of all current and past actual
inﬂation rates, with exponentially declining weights dependent on the speed of
adjustment. So, it becomes possible to rewrite Cagan’s money demand equa-
tion for real balances in observable terms. Algebraic rearrangement results in
an equation for inﬂation with the money stock and lagged inﬂation rates as
explanatory variables. This equation has been estimated by Cagan and, in his
footsteps, by numerous other researchers.5
In the perspective of the present essay on illusions three comments seem to
be relevant. The ﬁrst is the stability of the Cagan hyperinﬂation model and
the numerical coefﬁcients this requires. The second concerns the reliability of
the estimates of Cagan’s regressions. The third is the economic interpretation
of Cagan’s outcome and its relationship with possible alternative hypotheses
on the formation of expectations.
To examine the dynamics of hyperinﬂation one should determine whether
the price level increase results from the enormous money supply in the
countries considered or whether the price increases are self-generating when
started up. This means that the stability properties of the Cagan model are
of crucial importance. As a matter of fact the Cagan model results in a ﬁrst
order difference (or differential) equation whose properties deﬁne the stability
conditions. Decisive is the size of its root, which is determined by an amal-
gam of two model parameters: the price elasticity of money demand and the
speed of adjustment of expectations. The numerical estimates Cagan obtained
indicate that the hyperinﬂation processes in almost all of the seven countries
5 See e.g. Sargent (1993); Schuit and Winder (1992); Michael et al. (1944); Petrovic´ and
Vujosˇevic´ (1996).
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he studied were stable. This means that at any disturbance of equilibrium,
monetary or not, the price level tends to return to its equilibrium level. By
deﬁnition, an unstable dynamic process implies that any shock to the sys-
tem leads to a departure of equilibrium that is self-generating. This conclu-
sion, however, is based on a mechanistic view and mathematical properties
that perhaps do not have much policy relevance. For that, another than the
mathematical approach to interpret the Cagan model is wanted. A careful
economic interpretation of the mathematical model solution shows that in
the Cagan model an excessive money supply is the driving force of inﬂation.
This means that policy design failures are the basic source of hyperinﬂations,
leading to the conclusion that a change in the policy regime, which is sufﬁ-
ciently binding and for that reason widely believed, is required. However, to
achieve that conclusion we do not need the Cagan model per se. Neverthe-
less this model is useful because it convincingly shows that money matters
and does not behave erratically as was often believed at the time of Cagan’s
pioneering work. Though pathbreaking, and this regards my second point
of comment, Cagan’s statistical estimates were inaccurate because the estima-
tion procedure he used was inappropriate, generating biased and inconsistent
estimates. In the monetarist literature, several proposals have been made to
improve them, resulting in a ﬂow of novel and convincing research, mainly
of an econometric nature. However, this ﬁne econometric work has in no way
altered the policy conclusion that the hyperinﬂations of many countries in the
pre- and post-war-II episodes were mostly the simple consequence of the
enormous money stock increases in the countries concerned and seldom the
outcome of a self-generating process. Another novelty of Cagan’s research
was the use of adaptive expectations. From the late 1970s onwards this
hypothesis came under heavy attack and was replaced by the idea of ratio-
nal expectations. Sargent (1982; reprinted 1993), an inﬂuential proponent of
this view, believes the rational expectations hypothesis is difﬁcult to reconcile
with Cagan’s momentum model, while in an earlier article, co-authored with
Wallace (1973), he shows that with feedback from price increases to subse-
quent rates of money creation adaptive expectations are fully rational and not
ad hoc as was the criticism in the literature. Therefore, under speciﬁc circum-
stances, the rational expectations approach may be consistent with the policy
measures that brought drastic inﬂations under control in the hyperinﬂation
countries
Cagan examined because of its forward-lookingness. That behaviour takes
into account all information available including the anticipated or pre-emptive
policy design.6 Leaving the extensive and often econometrically futile research
6 The empirical results of Sargent and Wallace (1973) indicate that to explain hyperinﬂation
the monetary authorities seem to make money creation respond directly and systematically to
inﬂation. Accordingly, this was probably the reason why hyperinﬂations developed rather than
exogenous money creation.
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aside, Cagan’s study points out that extreme rises in prices depend almost
entirely on changes in the quantity of money. Rises in wages and the price
of foreign currency are in his view the result rather than the start. Therefore,
hyperinﬂation can be explained fully in terms of money demand and supply,
with monetizing government deﬁcits as a dominant force. While for this pol-
icy conclusion the many critical scholarly comments on the original Cagan
model may seem to be irrelevant, they are of course, as pointed out in Fase
(2002), of great fun for econometricians and mathematical economists. How-
ever, for policy-making, this research, though intellectually certainly interest-
ing, is overstated and deteriorated to l’art pour l’art, not doing justice to
Cagan’s pioneering monetarist work. This practice of elaborating Cagan is
somewhat misleading and perhaps a genuine trompe-l’oeil. The work con-
cerned is undoubtedly ﬁne scholarly research but without any practical impli-
cation or usefulness.
4 RESEARCH PERFORMANCE: MEASUREMENT OF SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY
Scholarly publications and evaluation of research are of great importance
to society and an undeniable part of academic life. To assess academic out-
put a variety of indicators have been developed to serve researchers and
their management. However, many scholars are skeptical towards these indi-
cators partly because of the increasing number of publications and, as noted
by Laband and Piette (1994), the explosive growth of new economic jour-
nals. Many feel the fashion of citation counts resembles an alternative mode
of hyperinﬂation. Of greater importance perhaps is the question whether
counting publications or citations and ranking of economic journals is that
relevant for society. Certainly, this practice has enhanced transparency in
academia and encouraged the publish or perish adage as well as multiple
authorship considerably in the face of increased competition among schol-
ars. However, how to separate among journal publications the wheat from
the chaff? This question gives rise to a variety of issues which all share a
deep concern over the intrinsic value of academic productivity. These con-
cerns have evoked an extensive literature and much debate. As to the latter, a
recent critical reﬂection is offered by Moed’s (2005) informative monograph
on citation analysis. For economics and the other social sciences authors
such as Anderson et al. (1989), Laband and Piette (1994) as well as Pieters
and Baumgartner (2000) published profound studies too, while over the
years a ﬂow of articles for particular countries has appeared.7 However, one
may suspect that these attempts uncover another trompe-l’oeil, certainly in
7 E.g. Dusansky and Vernon for the US, Kalaitzidakis et al. (1999, 2003) or Frey and
Eichenberger (2000) for Europe while in the Netherlands since the early 1980s the bi-monthly
Economisch Statistische Berichten and the weekly Intermediar have published rankings of indi-
vidual scholars and departments.
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economics. Citation analysis and bibliometric indicators to measure research
performance and academic productivity heavily weigh on academia and
individual scholars in basic science, social sciences and humanities. Eco-
nomics is a prominent sister within the disciplines constituting the social
sciences. So economic researchers have a genuine interest either to adhere
to or to look critically at bibliometric performance indicators and ques-
tion whether they should take these measurements at face value. Because
of the many arbitrary elements involved, perhaps a more relativist view on
this practice seems to be desirable. For this I see at least four reasons.
First, citation analysis is used to assess past research and publication activ-
ities of individual scholars, i.e. the basis for evaluation of research groups,
departments, universities and even countries. Evaluative bibliometrics count
citations during a certain time period, constituting the database for the cita-
tion indexes. The starting point is that all papers, notes, reviews and cor-
rections published in scholarly journals provide the documents that contain
citations constituting the formal linkage between the publications express-
ing scientiﬁc production. A citation index reﬂects the information signals
based on indexing. The pioneer of this registration activity was the Insti-
tute of Scientiﬁc Information or ISI, now named Thomson Scientiﬁc Inc.,
which in the 1950s started to generate all sorts of bibliographic informa-
tion. Since then bibliometrics became a ﬁeld of inquiry to serve the sci-
entiﬁc community including economics. However, a scholarly publication is
not only a piece of information but also a manifestation of research activ-
ity that seeks mutual recognition. Citation indexing serves this purpose.
So coverage, accuracy and a sound methodology are important parts of
this signalling device. In view of this, one could question the neglect of
monographs and books as well as the role played by the time window
chosen.
Second, an important practical use of citation analysis is the ranking of
scholars and journals according the so-termed journal impact factor. For a
particular year and journal this is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of
citations received by all documents published in the journal considered, and
the total number of citable and published documents in the journal during
the previous years. Citations are the scientiﬁc community’s version of dol-
lar – or for that matter euro – voting by the consumer. Consequently, the
impact factor denotes quality, inﬂuence and mutual recognition which are of
great interest to authors and research groups in image-making. Moreover, to
the publishers the impact factor is a marketing tool. Focusing on this sta-
tistic itself, one may wonder how robust the impact factor is in view of the
many more or less arbitrary decisions to be made in calculating it. In this
context the most important parameter is the time window, which often is a
time frame of 2–5 years, neglecting scores at later ages or in the very distant
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past.8 To enhance its robustness, calculation of the citation half-life may be
appropriate to obtain an additional assessment tool.9 This seemingly techni-
cal detail is important because impact factors are crucial for the ranking of
journals, which as a matter of fact determines the weights of journal pub-
lications of individual scholars. On the other hand, this ranking also inﬂu-
ences a potential author’s choice of journal to which to submit his or her
paper, which in turn to some extent determines citation behaviour and thus
scholarly reputation. This all looks like the famous chicken and egg problem
that wholly neglects a paper’s content or the academic task to disseminate
knowledge. In view of this, Kodrzycki and Yu (2005) of the Federal Reserve
of Boston, proposed another approach in ranking scholarly journals by tak-
ing into account the broader intellectual inﬂuence of economic journals in
social sciences, resulting in adjusted but ﬂexible citation statistics. This is also
desirable in view of the increasing importance of the Internet as a commu-
nication channel within the community of scholars. However, as Pieters and
Baumgartner (2000) have argued, the frequency of most citations in social
sciences also provides insight into the scholarly network through which aca-
demic knowledge diffuses in economics. They conclude that intra- and inter-
disciplinary communication of economic journals is limited and that only the
general journals and the theory and methods journals entertain reciprocal
citation relationships. Another point is that it is uncertain whether or not
the impact factor of journals not covered by ISI are as good as or even bet-
ter than those covered by ISI. Perhaps Moed (2005, p.3) was right when he
noted that there is perhaps no single perfect indicator of journal performance.
Undoubtedly journal impact is a performance aspect that reﬂects prestige and
quality.10
Third, for evaluating scholarly performance use is made of the institution
of peer review too. Peer review takes place both within the context of a jour-
nal’s editorial policy of refereeing submissions, awarding grants, the allocation
of scholarly prizes, and in evaluating research performance by committees.
Generally speaking, the credibility of peer review is unquestioned. Neverthe-
8 Anderson et al. (1989, pp. 181–182) examined this statistically and found that in econom-
ics and other social sciences the decay rate is substantial, which supports the fact that also in
economics certain research areas fall out of fashion and consequently disappear from current
literature and citation performance.
9 For biology Moed (2005, p. 97) examines this and found a truncated exponentially declin-
ing pattern. Perhaps for economics, which according to Lazear (2000) is not only a social sci-
ence but a genuine science, a similar pattern would result.
10 Quality and research performance is a multidimensional concept. Any attempt to express
them in a single number resembles reducing a multidimensional Euclidean space to one dimen-
sion without any loss of relevant information incorporated in the whole picture. Social scien-
tist have developed statistical methods such as factor and principal components analysis to
implement this dimension reduction empirically (see Cramer (1966) and Fase (1973), for early
applications in economics). So far I have not seen an attempt to use these techniques justifying
impact factors as an indicator for overall research performance.
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less, one may wonder whether citation scores and other bibliometric devices
implicitly play a role in peer evaluation. Statistical correlation between peer
judgements about research performances, on the one hand, and results of cita-
tion counts, on the other, reveals a strong relationship. However, this does
not necessarily mean that the two approaches measure the same phenomenon.
Strong correlation may validate the citation method because peer reviews
often take a broader perspective on academic prestige than only publication
or citation scores in top journals (see e.g. Fase (1996)). Perhaps this supports
the desirability of a relativist approach to citation scores, which would make
citation analysis less of a trompe-l’oeil.
Fourth, publishing in journals is mainly a supply driven process with a
minor role, if any, for the demand side. Some, e.g. Laband and Piette (1994)
in their industrial organisation approach to scientiﬁc publishing, even doubt,
on the basis of careful quantitative analysis, whether journal articles are read
at all. The main function of academic publishing in their view is to promote
personal visibility rather than disseminating knowledge. Perhaps to this one
may add that getting research published is sort of certiﬁcation or scholarly
award for its author. Research on this issue shows that the standards for get-
ting published evolve, predicting a shift from developing new insights towards
polishing submitted papers. Ellison (2000), who did extensive research on this
feature of academic publishing, concludes that this shift may reﬂect slowly
changing tastes that are likely to increase the gap between the preferences of
authors and readers. In the end this will have subtle negative welfare effects.
Authors such as Frey (2003) or Hodgson and Rothman (1999) even suggest
that today’s practice of referee’s vetoing against publication of submissions
are indicative of the existence of an institutional oligopoly of predominantly
US-based economic journals, a suggestion that is strongly supported by the
research of Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) on academic journal ranking. This
tendency may narrow theoretical pluralism in economics and is likely to con-
strain the scope of new ideas and approaches.
Deﬁnitive answers of how to evaluate research in a balanced manner are
not yet available. Acknowledgement of the multifacetness of scholarly perfor-
mance may help to recognize the danger of a one-dimensional approach by
way of citation analysis to express academic productivity. Perhaps an anal-
ogy with performance measurement in business and government, now popular
in the management literature, may be of some help. This literature (see e.g.
Kaplan and Norton (1996); Chang and Morgan (2000)) proposes the so-
called balanced scorecard as a suitable instrument to consider, besides pro-
ductivity, other performance dimensions such as professionalism, personal
skills, policy relevance, inﬂuence and intellectual independency. Taking into
account such a broader view may strengthen the evaluation of academic
research in general and in economics in particular. This will reduce the like-
lihood of citation scores to be a trompe-l’oeil in the economics. At the end
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of the day in academia the adage do right without expecting thanks should
perhaps be the rule to assess performance. A forward looking rather than the
backward looking attitude of counting citations of past work might be more
fruitful for genuine scolarship.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The maintained working hypothesis in this essay was that in research
convictions and beliefs matter, introducing the danger of a trompe-l’oeil in
assessing research efforts. In art history a trompe-l’oeil, which literally means
deception of the eye, is a tour de force of illusionism, prominent in the
Baroque but also popular with seventeenth century Dutch painters like Ger-
ard Dou or Frans van Mieris. Both artists liked to deceive their spectators
with artistic jokes (see e.g. Kleiner et al. (2001, p. 628)). To examine illu-
sions in economics I considered four examples of what may be a trompe-
l’oeil. These concern suggestive theoretical work or facts that deceive the
economic observer and preclude sound policy judgement. In some way, the
chosen examples have in common the notion of inﬂation in the form of either
price changes or excessive growth in journal publications or multiple author-
ship. Moreover, all explored cases have subtle social welfare effects which are
likely to be negative. This is most obvious in the neglect by policy makers of
money illusion and the measurement bias in price indexes. The one-dimen-
sional emphasis on certain types of research and performance indicators may
result in sub-optimal allocation of scarce resources too. We all know that this
is inefﬁcient and causes welfare losses. From a social welfare point of view,
this is unforgivable and ought to be avoided.
M.M.G. Fase∗
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